Every security review of OBEL eventually gets to the same question: does governing every request slow things down? The honest answer is yes. OBEL takes longer than calling a model directly, because it does more - it scrubs the prompt, classifies it against a sovereign schema, checks it against policy, routes it, and writes an audit record before the model is ever called. A platform that added zero latency would be a platform that skipped a step, and we don't think "faster" is a feature worth having if the thing it's faster at is not actually checking what left your network.
So rather than claim OBEL is somehow free, we measured it. What follows is the actual number for the part of the pipeline we control outright - the scrubbing and classification logic itself - compared honestly against how long a model call takes on its own, and against what the alternative actually costs when it goes wrong.
What we measured, and what we didn't
We're not claiming OBEL adds zero overhead end to end - authenticating the request, resolving the caller's tenant and policy, routing through the proxy, and committing the audit record all add real milliseconds on top of a bare API call, and some of that depends on network topology we don't fully control. What we can measure precisely, because it's pure in-process logic with no network call in the hot path, is the actual scrubbing and classification work: the part of OBEL's pipeline that decides whether a prompt contains something that shouldn't leave your network, and what it's allowed to touch.
We ran OBEL's scrubber and classifier directly, 500 times each, across five representative prompts - a plain request, one containing a social security number and an email address, one containing a live-looking AWS key, a code question, and a longer business document summary. Node's high-resolution timer, no network, no database, just the functions a prompt actually passes through before anything is decided.
0.009ms
Mean time for scrub + classify combined
500 runs × 5 prompt types, measured directly
0.02ms
99th percentile - the slowest realistic case we saw
~840ms
A direct, non-streamed Claude Haiku call, same machine, same network
5-run average, api.anthropic.com
Put plainly: the governance logic itself is a rounding error against the model call it sits in front of. Roughly a thousandth of one percent of total response time, in our measurement. That number is specifically for the scrub-and-classify compute - it does not include the proxy hop, tenant resolution, or the policy check, each of which adds a small, real amount on top. We're not hiding that. We're saying it doesn't change the conclusion.
Why we're not quoting one end-to-end number
The full-pipeline added latency depends on where your traffic originates relative to OBEL's edge and the model provider's region, which we don't control and won't pretend is a fixed constant. What we can tell you precisely is the one piece that's ours outright: the detection and classification logic, measured above. Treat the rest as "a handful of milliseconds, by design" rather than a number we'd ask you to take on faith.
What that time is actually buying you
The audit write doesn't even cost you that much of it. OBEL commits the governance record before the model call proceeds, but the GitHub-backed audit commit itself is dispatched after the response has already started streaming back to the user - the record is guaranteed, the user isn't waiting on it. What they are waiting on, for a few hundredths of a millisecond, is a decision: does this prompt contain something that needs to be stripped, is it classified above the level this org is allowed to send to a model, and does policy allow it through at all.
- Scrubbing - PII, credentials, and secrets identified and removed before the model ever sees the original text.
- Sovereign classification - every prompt assigned a protective marking, with anything above the approved ceiling hard-blocked before inference, not flagged after.
- Policy evaluation - the request checked against org-specific rules, not a generic default.
- A tamper-evident audit record - committed inline, not reconstructed later from logs that may or may not exist.
What skipping it actually costs
IBM's 2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report put the global average cost of a breach at $4.99 million - a new record, up 12% on the year before, and the highest the report has recorded in 21 editions.[1] That's the baseline. It gets worse specifically where AI is involved without governance behind it.
$4.99M
Global average cost of a data breach, 2026
IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report
$5.39M
Average cost where shadow AI was involved - up from $4.63M the year prior
IBM
92%
Of AI-related breaches happened at organisations with no proper AI access controls
IBM
247 days
Average time to identify and contain a breach - worse than the year before
IBM
Shadow AI incidents more than doubled as a share of breached organisations in the space of a year, from 20% to 43%, and AI-driven attacks now account for more than one in four malicious breaches - a 56% increase - adding roughly $1 million to the average cost of an incident where they're involved.[1] Only 32% of breached organisations had an AI policy in place at all, and that number is falling, not rising.
Faster is not the same thing as better
A prompt that skips classification reaches a model a fraction of a millisecond sooner. If that prompt contained something it shouldn't have, the time saved was never the point that mattered - what mattered was the 247 days it then takes, on average, to even notice. Optimising for speed at the one layer where the entire cost of being wrong is measured in millions of dollars and months of exposure is optimising the wrong variable.
“We could make OBEL faster by removing a check. We're not going to, and we'd be suspicious of anyone who tells you their governance layer is exactly as fast as not having one.”
- Denis Bouton
Where to look
The scrubbing and classification logic referenced here is detailed at useobel.ai/argus-i, and the full security architecture, including how the audit trail is committed without blocking the response, is at useobel.ai/security.
This piece was prepared by the OBEL editorial team at ninthLABS Ventures, drawing on an internal benchmark of OBEL's own scrubbing and classification logic and on IBM's publicly published 2026 Cost of a Data Breach Report.
References
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